Counts differ because each database indexes a different set of publications. We treat OpenAlex as the canonical count; Google Scholar is not shown (no API, and crawling it violates its ToS).
Behavior-based interventions involve restricting users based on what they do, rather than what they post. This practice is already established at major platforms. However, it has received little explicit philosophical scrutiny. This essay explores behavior-based interventions from the perspective of ethics and political philosophy. It first distinguishes interventions targeting behavior that is itself a rule violation (such as impersonation) from the harder class of cases in which no single action breaches a rule, but a combination of signals indicates misuse. It then argues that, because such interventions are best understood as defensive, the philosophical literature on defensive ethics yields the relevant criteria they must satisfy. Interventions should respect user autonomy by being triggered by conduct for which the user is responsible, ruling out demographic profiling and purely association-based signals. They should be suitable, necessary, and proportionate, with particular attention to the risk of false positives. The essay also defends the importance of transparency, graduated interventions, and meaningful appeals mechanisms. It flags the distinctive danger of governments seeking platforms’ behavioral predictions. And it closes by urging platforms to institutionalize engagement with scholars, civil society, and affected rights-holders.
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