Pia Hanfeld, Erik Imgrund, Felix Weißberg, Thorsten Eisenhofer, Wolfgang Hönig, Konrad Rieck · ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security (AISec) 2026 · 2026
DOI: 10.1145/3847352.3848104
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Autonomous vehicles, including self-driving cars and drones, heavily rely on machine learning models for perception and control. This reliance introduces a significant attack surface through adversarial patches—visual patterns that mislead learning models. While prior work has demonstrated that such patches can induce misclassifications or tracking failures, they fall short of enabling sustained control over autonomous systems in rapidly changing conditions. In this paper, we introduce continuous adversarial patches, a proof-of-concept attack that demonstrates the potential for sustained control over autonomous vehicles that rely on single object tracking. When displayed on a video screen, these patches guide drones along adversary-defined trajectories. We implement a diffusion model to produce continuous adversarial patches in real time, targeting PULP-Frontnet and YOLOv5, two object detection models used in drone research. Our method demonstrates successful trajectory manipulation under controlled conditions, including slingshot and freestyle maneuvers. We release our simulation environment and code to facilitate further investigation of this attack class and the development of robust countermeasures.
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