
Tony T. Nguyen · Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) 2026 · 2026
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23744647
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What follows when an argument diagnoses concentrated commercial and political power, then relies on institutions susceptible to that same concentration to implement its remedy? This brief examines an enforcement problem within an otherwise serious critique of the AI race. It does not assume that capture makes regulation impossible. It asks which additional institutional and technical conditions would make a proposed restriction credible. The underlying English manuscript distinguishes the source's diagnosis from its prescription. It examines hardware chokepoints, verification and restrictions on dangerous uses as different instruments with different observation and enforcement requirements. The institutional question is who authorizes and constrains the enforcer. The technical question is how the restricted conduct is specified and detected. Neither question is answered solely by naming a powerful gatekeeper or a dangerous capability. This record is a substantive public research brief accompanying the full manuscript. The work is independent of AI Frontiers and is not presented as peer reviewed. Related author edition: https://highlandreflexivepress.net/research/the-prosecutors-paradox/#acquire Complete related manuscript: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23744461 . AI tools assisted editorial preparation and formatting; Tony T. Nguyen is responsible for the research claims.
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) 2026 · 0 citations
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