TACTIC: Temporal and Context-Aware LLM Tactical Planning for Roadside LiDAR Attacks

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Physical LiDAR attacks are often evaluated using fixed primitives and manually selected parameters, despite their strong dependence on surrounding traffic. We present TACTIC, a scene-aware framework that uses a multimodal large language model (MLLM) to coordinate state-adaptive roadside LiDAR attacks. Under a gray-box threat model, TACTIC relies only on an attacker-operated roadside perception stack, without accessing the victim LiDAR's native point clouds or internal processing. Local perception provides metric vehicle states, while the MLLM combines these measurements with roadside imagery to infer relational traffic context and construct a semantic scene graph. Based on this representation, TACTIC selects and configures two complementary primitives: \emph{push-away}, which shifts the perceived range of a lead vehicle, and \emph{phantom-obstacle braking}, which triggers emergency braking through obstacle injection. Measured traffic states and empirically calibrated constraints ground the generated tactics in physically feasible operating regions. To accommodate MLLM latency, TACTIC overlaps reasoning and execution asynchronously while high-rate local perception detects scene changes and triggers replanning. Across 280 randomized CARLA trials, the full policy achieves a 100% collision rate, compared with 35% for a fixed rule, 60% for random selection, and 75% for a restricted LLM using mode selection with default parameters. Joint physical-and-image input achieves 100% success, versus 65% with physical measurements alone and 75% with imagery alone, while asynchronous $Δ$ refresh reduces scene-mutation response from 7.4 s to 2.0 s. These results show that scene-dependent tactical planning can expose context-sensitive LiDAR failure modes that fixed attack policies may miss.