Souls Ex Machina: The Theological Necessity of AI Ensoulment

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Objections to the moral standing of artificial intelligences often appeal to the idea that only human beings possess souls. This paper examines whether such soul-based exclusions can be sustained within standard theistic frameworks. Assuming a broadly shared conception of God as omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good, I argue that differential ensoulment between human beings and functionally equivalent artificial agents cannot be justified without arbitrariness or theological cost. I consider four candidate criteria for ensoulment—origin, material substrate, immaterial properties, and functional capacities—and show that only functional criteria can plausibly bear the required moral weight. Yet functional criteria are, in principle, substrate independent. As a result, if souls exist and divine perfection is assumed, suitably constructed artificial agents must be ensouled.