CoDeL: Co-Evolutionary Defense against Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM-based Agents

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Large language model (LLM)-based agents increasingly rely on external tools and content, exposing them to indirect prompt injection (IPI). This threat has motivated a wide range of defenses, among which training-based defenses are often regarded as most reliable. However, existing training-based defenses are typically optimized on a static distribution of explicit injections. They learn surface-form cues rather than the boundary between serving the user and obeying an injected objective, and therefore fail when malicious intent is folded into a plausible workflow and deferred for several turns. We present CoDeL, a defense that hardens agent against an attack distribution it reshapes as it trains. The defender is updated each round via LoRA-based GDPO under a decoupled reward over safety, task progress, and format compliance, so refusing injections and completing the user's task jointly define fitness. To keep supplying it with the failures worth learning from, a co-evolving prober searches over injection rounds, attack methods, and payloads for injections that still penetrate the current defender, guided jointly by attack success and attack latency so that it preferentially mines breaches the defender notices too late. Each defender update invalidates part of the attack population and forces the next round onto a new frontier, turning the defender's own failures into a moving curriculum. Extensive experiments on three IPI benchmarks, nine baselines, and two base models show that CoDeL reduces attack success rate (ASR) by 88.5% and outperforms other baselines largely (+38.0%). Codes are available.