BRFID: Toward Byzantine-Robust Federated Intrusion Detection

Counts differ because each database indexes a different set of publications. We treat OpenAlex as the canonical count; Google Scholar is not shown (no API, and crawling it violates its ToS).

Flipping 60\% of training labels from a single Byzantine client using label-flipping model poisoning self-degrades an attacker's own federated detection accuracy, $99.96\%$ (at no poisoning rate) to $84.33\%$ in a three-client federated IDS. Where the Federated global ensemble maintains stable accuracy across all tested poison rates, without a defense mechanism in place and without coordination between attackers. In this paper, we present empirical results quantifying the impact of label-flipping poisoning attacks on a three-client federated IDS trained on CICIDS2017 with non-IID attack subtype distributions across clients. We demonstrate that the signal of the adversarial self-compromise represents a detectable anomaly for exploitation for Byzantine client identification in the absence of target data exfiltration. We note that the aggregation step uses a Federated Forest (tree concatenation) rather than a parametric FedAvg; the results therefore measure the impact of poisoning on per-client performance under ensemble aggregation, and extension to genuine FedAvg with a parametric classifier is planned for future work.