How can algorithms reshape benevolence? The technocratic turn, multiple effects and collaborative governance of digital platform philanthropy

Counts differ because each database indexes a different set of publications. We treat OpenAlex as the canonical count; Google Scholar is not shown (no API, and crawling it violates its ToS).

Digital platform philanthropy is undergoing a technocratic turn: the regulatory object shifts from the behavioral compliance of charitable organizations to the output results of algorithmic models, and the regulatory logic transforms from the value judgment of "who deserves help" to data indicators derived from algorithmic operations. Drawing on theoretical resources from the sociology of technology, platform governance and the sociology of philanthropy, this paper reveals the three operational mechanisms of this turn—credit scoring, traffic allocation and automated traceability, analyzes its four induced effects—motivation narrowing, sympathy screening, responsibility shifting and compliance performance, examines the governance structure of platform dual roles, algorithmic transparency and accountability, and state-platform-society interaction, and explores directions for governance optimization from three dimensions: plural collaboration, procedural justice and diverse forms of philanthropy. The core proposition of this paper is that the real challenge of the technocratic turn lies not in how to make algorithms regulate benevolence more precisely, but in how to make algorithms serve the social goals of philanthropy through institutional development.