Naveen Sundaresan · Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) 2026 · 2026
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.22723147
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Existing regulatory and standards guidance on human oversight of autonomous AI systems, including the EU AI Act’s human oversight requirements for high-risk systems [1], NIST’s AI Risk Management Framework [2], ISO/IEC 42001 [3], and Singapore’s proposed MAS Guidelines on AI Risk Management [4] and IMDA Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI [5], establishes that oversight and intervention capability must exist. None of these frameworks specify how an independent auditor verifies that a stop mechanism actually works under the conditions where it is needed. This paper proposes a conformance-based audit approach: a defined Target of Evaluation, five testable control families (trigger recognition, authority, cessation, latency, and failure resilience), and evidence requirements attached to each that distinguish measured system behavior from procedural self-attestation. The paper also specifies an example auditable criterion and a machine-readable control representation. The intent is to convert descriptive containment guidance into auditable criteria consistent with established independent third-party audit methodologies for AI systems, and to propose a companion vendor-neutral assurance harness, connecting to deployments through pluggable adapters, capable of generating the evidence such criteria would require.
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